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THE HERALDS OF RUIN: SCHOPENHAUER, NIETZSCHE AND GERMAN EDUCATIONAL DECAY

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ABSTRACT

In the history of German philosophy, so markedly systemic and rigorous, two thinkers form a true game changer. Both profound critics of their time, they drew their criticisms to almost every aspect that shaped the intellectual reality of their time. In this sense, this article aims to analyze the criticisms that these two philosophers, that is, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, weaved against the decay and ruin of the educational system and German and European culture. To this end, a bibliographical reading will be made about what attacked these thinkers, as well as about Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche's thought on education and how it diagnosed, by educational decay, the German and European cultural decay.

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INTRODUCTION

The influence of German thought on modernity is something more than notorious. The result of a culture and a precise language, German philosophy has always occupied a privileged space among the great philosophical currents of the West. Known for its rigor and systematicity, so well expressed in the works of thinkers such as Kant and Hegel, this philosophy spawned two of the most overwhelming thinkers of all time, who would forever change the way the Western world would see itself. Both at the same time so close and so far away, these two authors left their unmistakable mark on the history of human thought and are still venerated, studied and imitated today. Although they were, for some time, neglected by their contemporaries, future generations were given the task of rediscovering them and putting them in their proper place. They are both a destiny, but it would not be much exaggeration to call them prophets. Their names are too well known: Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. The paths in which they have trodden their ideas are broad and varied. However, both concentrated much of their reflections on a theme that was quite dear to them: education and culture. Starting from the beginning of the analysis of the German culture itself, both were able to make an accurate diagnosis not only of the state in which the educational system of their country was, but of the whole of Europe. Both teachers and, in some way, poets in their own way, these two thinkers laid bare the fallacies of an educational system whose end

was but a profound intellectual failure, extremely far from the real goals of a university culture. Following the common course of its time, Germany did not fail to suffer the impacts caused by the nineteenth century, impacts that were reflected in all aspects of its culture. Traditional German universities have not passed unscathed to such changes. And for the sometimes nostalgizing spirit of these thinkers, such changes necessarily consisted of a true intellectual and cultural collapse of their people, who kindly gave way to an educational system co-opted by the State, in which the law of the least effort and the theatricality of empty and purposeless scholarship prevail. Severe analysts have not escaped the paradoxes of a teaching whose emptiness is the tonic, of a formation that appeals to the grotesque and that sells illusions while imprisoning its adherents in a web of honors and titles, which would result in the total intellectual ruin not only of Germany, but of the whole of Europe. Critics and enthusiasts come ring a part to launch their criticisms of the reflections of these two thinkers on the topic. However, it is undeniable that both were able to unmask the siren song coming from the universities and educational establishments of their time, a corner that still resonates in our time, even more attractive and seductive. At first, Schopenhauer was tasked with bare-blooded such fallacies, and Nietzsche's mission to destroy the easy charms of an education in pieces and a superficial culture, deceptive and co-opted to the interests of trade and the State.

Rationale for criticism of education: The educational approach for Schopenhauer surpasses any prescriptive model. For him, the important thing

is that philosophy remains an autonomous knowledge, far from any censorship and limiting frontier. Because of these aspects, it is relevant to point out the paths that Arthur Schopenhauer took to develop his criticism, highlighting characteristics of his thinking that illustrate the claim of independent knowledge in the 19th century. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy in academic circles was presented in a reserved way, and this is due to three factors: his criticism of reason, the irrational as a principle of the world and the literary style adopted by him. (BARBOZA, 2015). Universities have greater sympathy for the forms of the world that indicate reason as the principle of the world because they exalt man as the crown of creation, ensuring his so-like power in the face of reality. In his book *The world as a will and as a representation*, from 1819, the German philosopher presented an irrationalist perspective as a principle of the world. The will, being the essence that controls life, drives the individual to an unceasing desire, is a cycle that accentuates the pains of the world and, because of this, demonstrates a pessimistic sense. It is a conception that confronts an entire rationalist tradition of knowledge. Because of this, the philosopher was not recognized by the public and philosophy scholars. However, after the publication of the book *Parerga and Paralipomena* in 1851, Schopenhauer became known and began to have more followers, philosophy teachers began to dedicate courses to his work, and critics of the idealistic system began to have it as a reference. In the following passage of the first preface to his main work, the author describes how he resisted for thirty years the lack of recognition of his ideas:

While philosophy has long had to serve as a means, on one side for public purposes, on the other for private purposes, I, on the contrary, pursued my intellectual bell unfazed for more than thirty years. And I did so precisely because I had to do it, and I could not be otherwise, because of an instinctive impulse, yet supported by the confidence that what is thought of in a true way and that sheds light on obscurity will at some point be seized by another thinking spirit, impressing him, rejoicing him and consoling him. (SCHOPENHAUER, 2015, p. XXXVI).

Thus, the author's ideas resisted time, making a point of denying any subservience of philosophy to the interests of the State. Therefore, the thinker noticed that in the educational context it became an instrument of state and personal purposes. By going against this tendency, he uses the thought of Immanuel Kant, for pointing for an autonomous reflection of philosophy. The theoretical criterion revolves around Kant's reasoning of proposing the idea of a knowledge that turns on itself, seeking its status and its conditions of possibility, as an analyst and judge of his own time (CACCIOLA, 2011). In view of this, it incorporates kantian principles into his ideas. To understand the basis of Schopenhauerian criticism, it is important to highlight the division of labor between the faculties that composed the University described by Kant in *The Conflict of Faculties*, 1778. For the Prussian, the division of faculties could be compared to an industry work, because the appointment of public masters at different levels and according to teaching is similar to the industrial division. And such a finding allowed them to be called corporate scholars. On the other hand, the organization of knowledge prioritized theology, law, medicine and lastly philosophy. By determination, the first three faculties were classified as superior, philosophy, however, occupied a lower position. For Kant, this hierarchy was based on the reason of state, not corresponding to a rational division itself, but by state instrumentalization. The intellectual work was not consulted, that is, the figure of the scholar had no importance in the classification of faculties. For this reason, we can understand that:

Theology, which directed the spirits of the subjects in view of their beliefs and actions, the second, which organized the regime of goods and estates; the third, Medicine, administered health policy for healthy subjects to serve the state well. The faculty of philosophy, without direct interference in state administration, occupied the lower place. (CACCIOLA, 2011, p.12).

The government had an interest in higher colleges because it was a means to control the people. And because of this he granted the right to sanction the doctrines spoken as superior, excluding contraries systems. The concern was not in teaching, but in manipulating through education. Because of this, Kant proposed a resizing in which he reversed the state structure and by primacy raised philosophy in a leading space in education. Thus, the faculty called inferior would be the first in the order of importance, followed by medicine and law, and lastly that of the theology. For the Prussian philosopher, erudite faculty is necessary, and "[...] regardless of the government's orders regarding its doctrines, have the freedom not to give orders, but at least to judge all those that have to do with scientific interest" (KANT, 2008, p. 30). That said, the understanding is that higher faculties are engaged in training state officials with direct interference in the life and behavior of subjects, and philosophy is configured as an independent knowledge, without direct intervention of the government, giving room for reason to criticize the other knowledge applied in the rational order, being a task only to the legislation of reason.

This led the illustrated philosopher to observe that the existing conflict with the other faculties was due to the fact that they were linked to the State, both by spirit and by material goods of the subjects, that is, dependent on structure and intellectually. This was due to the fact that they were not at the discretion of reason, but subservient to state purposes. It is therefore remarkable that the court of reason established by Kant could issue judgments on any matter of knowledge, incorporating all aspects present in the disciplines. It was up to the faculty of philosophy to guide both the human sciences and physics and mathematics, and to be judged according to the principles of reason, based on the freedom that was inseparable to him (CACCIOLA, 2011). In philosophy there was an interest in seeking the truth, and the more the staff of higher colleges were informed of their duty, they would find no problems in their exhibitions. In view of the presented, we will see below Schopenhauer's meditations on the decline of education.

Schopenhauer and the decline of education: In the previous section, we try to highlight the foundation of Schopenhauer's criticism of education and that for this reason they are relevant to the establishment of the bases of his criticism of teaching. It is possible to indicate a priori that the educational dimension defended by Schopenhauer distasted philosophy as a means of life, that is, it could not be a product of survival, but of intellectual life experience. It can be affirmed that, by virtue of this, philosophical knowledge for Schopenhauer should not be under the tutelage of the State, and that such a perspective cultivated the appearance of false scholars. This commitment to the autonomy of knowledge was a position against the three post-Kantian philosophers: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, who for many years influenced intellectual life in Germany. This is clear in the following passage of his magna work, "[...] the reader will always find me in the point of view of reflection, that is, rational deliberation, never from the point of view of inspiration called intellectual intuition or absolute thought, whose most correct names are intellectual emptiness and charlatanism" (SCHOPENHAUER, 2015, p. XXXVI). With this revealed a tendency not only in his country, but as throughout Europe, to value what he classified as false and bad. In this scenario, it is essential that we demonstrate that Schopenhauer's argument is a direct opposition to post-Kantian philosophers. It is a counterpoint to philosophical systemticity integrated to the University, which favored knowledge according to the concept of reason. As a result, Redyson (2009, p. 32), comments that "[...] the problem was not in Kant but in the idealists and teachers of philosophy who insisted on talking and writing about a Kant that did not exist or a misrepresented Kant." Beyond this aspect, the fact that Schopenhauer's irrationalist thought matrix was not successful motivated him to undertake severe criticism of the intellectuals of his time.

That said, it is relevant to mention that the philosophy of the German author has no intention of describing a way of life, that is, a moral that has a connection with duty. This extends to education, he does not bother to establish any plan, let alone guidelines for the University. However, it directs criticism to the teaching of philosophy in educational institutions. Unlike Kant, who sought to integrate philosophy into the university structure, Schopenhauer rejected this possibility, because it was necessary to maintain independence from philosophical knowledge, considering that knowledge in its context was tied to the powers of the State and the Church. According to Cacciola (2011), the conflict between the faculties seemed to the philosopher of Danzig insanável, the reason in this case is ineffective, because it can not prevent the intervention of the Church in the State and this in the University. We see, in this sense, an indication of the author in contesting the rationalist tradition, to the detriment of the irrationalist essence of the will, the maximum concept of his ideas. Moreover, the philosopher of pessimism did not believe that the State was the realization of ethical life, but an abstraction that hides the interest of domination, in this way it would be only a reflection of the interests of the individuals who compose it (CACCIOLA, 2011). In this case, it approximates the educational sense of ethics, which, guided by the present selfish feeling of the individual, overlaps the will of the strongest over another. It is a system that cultivates the control of the strongest in the face of the weakest. Regarding the position of the university professor, Schopenhauer pointed out that due to the existingsubservience to the interests of the State, philosophy professors lost the capacity for reflection, as well as those of law, theology and medicine. Therefore, there is a challenge of reason as an organ of philosophy, it will not triumph over interest in the breadwinner (CACCIOLA, 2011). Now, the German philosopher criticized the writers who wrote for money, depending on profit. In suma, the German literature constituted in part by the university professor was, in the author's view, interested in literary vanity, when in fact he should be concerned with instruction. For him, false scholars occupied the banks of the German chairs. On this issue of independence in teaching and scholarship, Schopenhauer comments that:

Among independent teachers and scholars there has been, since a long time ago, a certain antagonism, which may be clarified by the comparison with that which exists between dogs and wolves. Teachers have, by their position, great advantages related to the recognition by contemporaries. On the other hand, independent scholars have, by their position, great advantages related to the

recognition by posterity, because this second type of recognition requires, among other things very rare, also a certain idleness and a certain independence. (SCHOPENHAUER, 2015, p. 28). This distinction is necessary for Schopenhauer to make a counterpoint to the scholar who is superficial and does not think for himself. The German scholars were those who transmitted their thoughts in the voice of others, that is, free intellectuals. In differently, geniuses were those who contemplated and absorbed the essence of life by the book of the world. This is due to the fact that the true intellectual thinks for himself and of his own free will, and consequently produces authentic material. Because of this he comments that: "The works of all truly capable minds are distinguished from the others by the character of resolution and determination, from which clarity comes, because such people always knew clearly and determined what they wanted to express" (SCHOPENHAUER, 2015, p. 49). This condition directly determines the educational field to which Schopenhauer valued, precisely for this reason he employed teachers the task of being coherent educational models. It was necessary, therefore, to have a harmony between what a given author defended and what he practiced, the theoretical field should be in line with the empirical. Thus, we can conclude that Arthur Schopenhauer's thinking of education presents a critical scale that accompanies the position of power of those who allegedly compete for functions at faculties and nevertheless develop questionable means to instruct. These aspects are exposed in the first case in relation to the submission of the academic environment to political and religious powers, and then to question the intellectual condition to which teachers transmit knowledge. Undoubtedly, the dimension of this criticism incorporates a culture experienced in the nineteenth century, which mirrors in education literary references and above all philosophical. Finally, we will comment below on the influence that Schopenhauer exerted on Friedrich Nietzsche's thinking in relation to education and how the philosopher of the eternal return was, alongside the pessimistic thinker, one of the fiercest critics of the educational decay of Germany and Europe as a whole.

Nietzsche and crisis in education and culture: Nietzsche is certainly a case apart from the history of German philosophy. A profound critic of Western civilization, Röcken's thinker became known all over the world for his acidic philosophy, which preached the transvalorization of all values and expressed itself through aphorism, a genre of which boasted to be the most perfect cultor among the Germans. His hammer addressed almost every major theme of Western thought and at all left a deep mark. With education it would be no different. Brilliant student, called pastorzinho by his colleagues and lord of a discipline that comes to scare, the young Fritz from an early age was an example of dedication, as pointed out the account of Isabel, his sister, collected by Crane Brinton in his beautiful study of the philosopher:

Once, just when they finished school, here [sic] a tremendous rain. Where's our Fritz? The children, by weight, had shot disorderly, street in fora [sic]. Here comes finally Fritzinho, by Priestergasse, right, bringing the slate covered by the cap, with the handkeron on top. Seeing him coming, soaked to the bone, our mother scolded him. But he, with the utmost seriousness, answered him: it is forbidden to jump and run in the street. It is recommended that the boys go home with great judgment and with all purpose [sic]. The case is that Fritz never deviated from this rule, nor in the most adverse circumstances. (BRINTON, 1942, p. 6).

It is not surprising that such an individual, so attached to the rules and norms, the result of a rigid and orderly education, raised his voice against the changes that the educational system of his time was going through. If, as Carpeaux points out in his Concise History of German Literature, Nietzsche was the third great revolution of the Germanic¹ language, this innovation was shaped at the expense of a discipline and rigor that the philosopher of eternal return no longer found in the academic circles of his time, a decline that was confirmed in the following century, as the beautiful essay of the Master of Vienna points out, writing about the state of the university of his hometown, in the middle of the twentieth century:

The disappointment was too great. I saw the library covered in dust, the noisy auditoriums, stupidity and cynicism above and below the teachers' chairs, easy and fraudulent exams, brutalities of gangs who shouted the stupid political slogans of the day, and who were called "academics". The last time I passed near this "temple of the Muses", the building was closed; the intellectuals had joined an immense popular manifestation. I knew very well what that meant to me: goodbye forever. Looking

through the cracks of the monumental doors – we were in the spring – I saw under the white light of the sun the porticoes, the old stones, the garden, and the naked goddess, having on his lips the enigmatic smile of death. And I recognized a definitive end. (CAPEAUX, 2015, p. 239).

This definitive end, on which Carpeaux speaks, was foretold and laid bare by Nietzsche, whose argumentative force actually puts on the ground the educational fallacies of his time. It is true that Schopenhauer had already been a profound critic of this system, even writing memorable texts on the subject, as the following excerpt points out:

When we observe the quantity and variety of educational and learning establishments, as well as the large number of students and teachers, it is possible to believe that the human species attaches great importance to instruction and truth. However, in this case, appearances also deceive. Teachers teach to make money and do not strive for wisdom, but for the credit they earn giving the impression of owning it. And students do not learn to gain knowledge and instruct themselves, but to be able to chatter and to gain airs of important. Every thirty years, a new generation emerges in the world, people who know nothing and now devour the results of human knowledge accumulated for millennia, in a summary and hurried way, then want to be smarter than the whole past. It is with this objective that this generation attends university and ceds to books, always to the most recent, those of their time and proper for their age. Only what is brief and new! Just as the generation is new, which soon begins to issue judgments. - as for the studies done simply to earn the bread of each day, nor did I take them into account. (SCHOPENHAUER, 2013, p. 19).

It is notorious, therefore, how much of Nietzsche's criticism of education and the intellectuals of his time had already appeared in Schopenhauer. However, the author's own teaching experience of "Gaia Ciência", as well as his love for the Greeks and the development of his philosophy, led him to an improvement, to a true denunciation of the pseudoerudition and academic intelligence of his country. The years spent at the University of Basel, although sometimes troubled, were of great help to him, providing him with a broader view of what would in fact be an educational institution. As Brinton recalls:

It was not him, incidentally, a mau [sic] teacher, especially in the early years. As a lecturer, he was less shy and fearful, feeling more guaranteed by the table. He spoke clearly and competently, though without oratory talent. He was told [sic] then the ideas [sic], and he managed to hold the attention of the most pedantic and even the most cautious auditoriums. He also seems to have given you good bills in high school. Then, unfastening [sic] the less intelligent students, he addressed exclusively to others. Although he was distracted, short-sighted and overly intellectual, he knew how to impose himself on the little girl. After all, his students, naturaes [sic] da Suissa [sic] and therefore of Germanic origin [sic], knew their place. (BRINTON, 1942, p. 41)

The old European education, especially of a humanist nature, then finds in the young teacher a more than plausible and convincing² example. However, little by little Nietzsche was moving away from the academic atmosphere and turning against her and her creeds³. Worshipper of the Greeks, both for his formation and for his personality⁴, and, contrary to what is commonly

²The vision of a certain ennoblement of the educator is a constant in the history of the West. From Socrates to us, though with great paradoxes, the image of a good teacher always comes tied to a certain cult. Nietzsche, however, although a good teacher, is not such a perfect model, especially because of the tone of his work, whose essence is undeniable, requires a high degree of idleness, which is hardly found in the class of academics. However, it is equally undeniable that the model of educator he sought is the same proclaimed by humanism, for example, of an Erasmus. As he says: "I recognize. Just as philosophers sculpt the image of the sage, rhetorical or orator, in order to make it almost nonexistent in practice, so it is much more convenient to outline the profile of the educator than to point out individuals who embody the model traced. In fact, commitment of such a nature should be of public origin, either on the part of the profane authorities or by ecclesiastical proceres. Just as individuals are preparing to fight in the line of combat and those who sing in temples, so, with greater dedication, one should prepare those who will form the children of citizens in the line of righteousness and freedom." (ROTTERDAM, 2008, p. 101).

³Here we must repeat Brinton's penetrating observation: "Nietzsche seems to have regarded, from the outset, his duties at the University of Basel [sic] as a deviation from his true vocation. He made the most of leisure and holidays, complained more and more about being sick, shortened the school hours as much as possible. However, the publication of the book on Greek tragedia [sic] gnated him with such a reputation that it eventually freed him [sic] from the nightmare of teaching." (BRINTON, 1942, p. 39).

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¹The passage in which Carpeaux points out this fact is as follows: "Twice, the German literary language had been revolutionized and reformed: the first time, by Luther; the second time, by Goethe and the translation of Shakespeare by August Wilhelm Schlegel. The third revolution is Nietzsche's. And it was so profound that from any poetry, novel, drama or even German scientific work of the 19th and 20th centuries the connoisseur of the language can soon diagnose after having read a few lines: it was written before Nietzsche, or else it was written after Nietzsche." (CARPEAUX, 2013, p. 161).

thought, a man deeply rooted in his time⁵, Nietzsche's criticisms turned, at first, to the type of teaching taught in universities, as well as to the sometimes mercenary and false character of educators. As he himself confesses:

But let no one think that the establishments that drive him and prepare him for this fight can, in one way or another, be regarded as establishments of culture in a serious sense of the word. These are institutions that are set to overcome the needs of life; therefore, they can promise to train employees, merchants, officers, wholesalers, agronomists, doctors or technicians. In these institutions, in any case, different laws and measures different from those that allow the establishments to be founded for culture apply: and what in the first case is allowed, that is, ordered as possible, would be in the second case a criminal injustice. (NIETZSCHE, 2003, p. 105).

This disbelief in institutions, which is increasingly accentuated not only in Nietzsche's work, but in German⁶ culture itself, gradually became one of the deepest reflections of the very cultural sense of education of its time. A man of the century of nascent technology, Nietzsche was around with a time for which erudition gave way to illustration and in which culture represented, above all, a cover of a certain intellectual color, much more propagandistic than properly educational. This profound change that passed through the century did not fail to affect educational institutions throughout Europe, and would not be different in Nietzsche's Germany. The emptiness of this institution called the university was something more than evident, consisting almost only of a technical education, whose purpose was exhausted in itself. As Nietzsche still states:

Our 'autonomous' students live without philosophy and art: therefore, what need would still be for him to establish relations with the Greeks and Romans, since now no one has more reason to stimulate an inclination for him, and since, moreover, the ancients now exist in a solitude hardly accessible and in a majestic distancing. Therefore, the universities of our time have absolutely, and indeed in a very coherent way, any relation to cultural trends already totally extinct, and there are founded philology chairs exclusively for the education of new generations of philologists, who in turn are responsible for the philological preparation of the students of the gymnasium: a vital circle that takes advantage of neither the philologists nor the gymnasiums, but above all, for the third time, it proves that the University is not what it would pompously wish to be – a cultural institution. (NIETZSCHE, 2003, p. 129)

This critique of the denial of academic culture, now exiled in its own shadow, gradually was taking, in Nietzsche's texts, the form of a profound criticism of the very sense of teaching and culture. Influenced by Schopenhauer's reading, increasingly frustrated as an educator and involved in the creation of an

have regarded, from the outset, his duties at the University of Basel [sic] as a deviation from his true vocation. He made the most of leisure and holidays, complained more and more about being sick, shortened the school hours as much as possible. However, the publication of the book on Greek tragedy [sic] gnated him with such a reputation that it eventually freed him [sic] from the nightmare of teaching." (BRINTON, 1942, p. 39).

⁵ Nietzsche is sometimes seen above all as a prophet. However, he was a man deeply rooted in his time. This in no way denies his condition as a prophet attributed by many, especially since, contrary to popular opinion, prophets are the most present and contemporary men in their time. Maybe that's why they can advance something from the future. Here, we must once again quote Brinton: "Both in anti-intellectualism and Nietzsche evolutionism is proof that he was a son of the time – an eccentric son [sic] and endiabrado, perhaps, but by no means a spurious son [sic]. In fact, in its anti-intellectualism and in its evolutionism, as in that of its most strangled contemporaries, the 'climate of opinions' is manifested, which however [sic] needs to be properly explained". (BRINTON, 1942, p. 147).

⁶It is enough that we remember, for example, books such as Hermann Hesse's "The Game of Glass Beads", to see how, even in the twentieth century, the vision of an author as keen as he still associated universities with a somewhat unproductive and useless kind of scholarship. This novel is representative both because it is a German author of the twentieth century, and because it is a futuristic plot, which describes a mythical community of the year 2200, symbol of empty and purposeless scholarship, whose end lies in itself. Castaly, the city invented by Hesse, however, like the German institutions of Nietzsche's time, believes it to be a source of freedom and culture. Thus it is clear in the following excerpt of the work: "The degree of freedom and choice in all areas of knowledge and scientific research, which the elite student enjoys, after having absolved the preparatory courses, is in fact very high. This freedom is only restricted – when colleges and interests are not from the beginning very extensive – by the obligation that all independent students take, to follow a previous study plan for an entire semester, and to undergo during this time a gentle control of school authorities" (HESSE, [?], p. 80-81).

entirely new philosophy for his time, Röcken's thinker Nietzsche launches his criticisms of the very validity of German culture, for him drowned, like everything else, in the blackest trade. He says:

But in a foreshown, what have these considerations revealed to us? That everywhere, now, culture seems to be more excited, nothing is known of this target. As much as the State emphasizes what it makes meritorious for culture, it promotes it to promote itself and does not conceive of any target that is superior to its good and existence. What traders want, when they constantly require instruction and culture, is always, after all, profit. (NIETZSCHE, 1999, p. 294).

This profound crisis in education and teaching necessarily lead to an increasingly decadent culture and in tatters. Nietzsche believed that it was precisely because of this intellectual laxity, this true lack of spirit, that one owed the appearance of an almost degenerate type of individual, to which he gave the name of philistine of culture. Now, instead of the truly gifted men, who find themselves only in the past (such as Goethe, for example, or Lessing) what once reigned in Germany of his time (and therefore throughout Europe) was a vulgar type, whose intelligence was worthy of mistrust, but which came to occupy all the cultural posts of his time. As he himself confesses:

It is equally evident, however, that our public and private life does not have the mark of a fruitful and stylish culture, if our great artists, with serious insistence and with the honesty inherent in greatness, have recognized and still recognize this monstrous and deeply humiliating fact for a gifted people, how to explain that it may replace among the Germans instructed to more complete satisfaction – a satisfaction that, since the last war, it breaks out for any reason in cries of joy and triumph? [...] What would be the dominant force capable of prescribing this non-existence? What kind of men have become powerful enough in Germany to forbid feelings so alive and so powerful, or at least to impress that those feelings are expressed? This force, this kind of men, I want to call it by its own name: they are the *Philistines of culture*. (NIETZSCHE, 2008, p. 21).

It will be against these individuals and their fish culture that Nietzsche will shout his hammer. Throughout his life, the German thinker has not failed to point out the flaws in German and European culture. Building on his imposing philosophy, the once-little Fritz will become one of the most shrewd critics in the entire history of morals, Christianity and Western philosophy. Your notes on the ruin of German education are but the beginning of a diagnosis that will cost you a lifetime. Like Schopenhauer, in whom he found, at first, enough clarity to see beyond the limits of philology, Nietzsche did not come to answer the essential questions of his country's educational problem and its time. Rather, he was a critic, an attentive, restless and awed observer of Europe's educational and cultural decay. The century to come would only confirm your notes. The man who intended to transvalue all values would surely be astounded to see how precisely his prophecies were realized. The European educational and cultural ruin, far from coming to an end, increasingly shows strong signs of its worsening. The answer to such problems neither Schopenhauer nor Nietzsche were able to provide. It may not even exist, at least that easy. In any case, the diagnosis was made.

CONCLUSION

It will never be too much to reaffirm that the criticisms made by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche have had strong consequences for the way the West has been represented. If many of his contemporaries have passed indifferent to his analyses, the same cannot be said of his successors. However, perhaps to the sadness of these thinkers, their diagnosis proved increasingly true and accurate. The 20th century would not make many advances towards educational and cultural emancipation. On the contrary: the phenomenon of the two great wars and the economic, political and ideological intensification made education and culture, far from emancipating individuals, made them even more submissive and governable. Far from being an eminently Germanic or European problem now, the crisis in the educational system takes on global airs every day, and imposes on contemporary thinkers a task that is not easy to think about strategies through which these barriers can be overcome. The advance of financial capital, whose revenue is too well known, drags teaching and culture to a control never before seen, which would leave the German nobles alittleaway. There are the critics, it is true, but these resign themselves to repeating the same old moldy theses of the manuals in which they read them, letting slip the very center of the question. Nietzsche and Schopenhauer might blush at seeing how old Europe gets carried away by the sweetest fallacies and how, in front of a contemporary scholar, even a Strauss would look like a true Greek god in intelligence, elegance and vigor. The challenges remain and remain launched. The answers may not be the same. But wherever

they come from, the case is that they have never been more urgent and necessary.

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